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 1 
Abstract 2 
In countries from which Crimean-Congo haemorrhagic fever (CCHF) is absent, the causative virus 3 
CCHF virus (CCHFV) is classified as a hazard group 4 agent and handled in containment level 4.  In 4 
contrast, most endemic countries out of necessity have had to perform diagnostic tests under 5 
biosafety level (BSL) 2 or 3 conditions. In particular, Turkey and several of the Balkan countries 6 
have safely processed more than 100000 samples over many years in BSL-2 laboratories. It is 7 
therefore advocated that biosafety requirements for CCHF diagnostic procedures should be 8 
revised, to allow the required tests to be performed under enhanced BSL-2 conditions with 9 
appropriate biosafety laboratory equipment and personal protective equipment used according to 10 
standardized protocols in the affected countries. Downgrading of CCHFV research work from Cl-11 
4,BSL-4 to Cl-3 ,BSL-3 should also be considered. 12 
 13 
  14 
Introduction 15 
Crimean-Congo haemorrhagic fever virus (CCHFV), a member of the Nairovirus genus of the 16 
family Bunyaviridae, causes a tick-borne zoonotic infection (Crimean-Congo haemorrhagic 17 
fever (CCHF)) in parts of Africa and Eurasia [1]. CCHFV has been classified as a hazard group 4 18 
pathogen (UK) or risk group 4 (Europe, USA, international) in countries that have promulgated 19 
biosafety regulations, and should accordingly be handled in containment level 4 (CL4, UK) or 20 
biosafety level 4 (BSL-4, Europe, USA, international) laboratories (Table 1).   21 
Signs and symptoms after a sudden onset of disease 1–7 days post infection, progress from 22 
high grade of fever, headache, fatigue, myalgia, abdominal pain, nausea, vomiting, diarrhoea, 23 
thrombocytopenia and rash, to haemorrhages from various body sites, shock and death in 24 
severe cases. Reported mortality rates vary widely from to 2-30% across studies and endemic 25 
countries [2,3]. 26 
Apart from transmission by tick bite as a major route of infection, transmission can also occur 27 
through handling or squashing of infected ticks, and contact with the blood of viraemic 28 
animals, or blood and other body fluids of patients. Consequently, livestock farmers, abattoir 29 
and healthcare workers (HCWs) dominate the literature on reported infections. Nosocomial 30 
transmission to HCWs in close contact with patients in the acute phase have been 31 
documented throughout the endemic areas and are often linked to breaches of, or non-32 
existent, barrier nursing techniques, or to percutaneous needlestick injuries [4].  33 
Following the occurrence of the first recognized outbreaks of ‘Crimean haemorrhagic fever’ in 34 
soldiers and displaced persons exposed to ticks while sleeping outdoors in 1944 and 1945, 35 
there were similar outbreaks associated with exposure of large numbers of people to ticks in 36 
major land reclamation or resettlement schemes in parts of the former Soviet Union, 37 
culminating in an epidemic in Khazakstan in 1989 [5] [6] [7]. Subsequently, there were reports 38 
of a series of lesser outbreaks associated with exposure of people to blood and ticks from 39 
slaughter animals imported from Africa and Asia into the Near East [8]. Further large-scale 40 
outbreaks that occurred during the late 1990s and early 2000s, involved exposure of war 41 
refugees to outdoor conditions in Kosovo, Albania, Macedonia and the Afghanistan-Pakistan 42 
border area [7,9]. Finally, an outbreak of unprecedented magnitude emerged in Turkey in 43 
2003 with 9787 clinical and laboratory confirmed CCHF cases by 2015. This outbreak has been 44 
ascribed to an increase in the tick population triggered by climate change, altered grazing 45 
practices and prohibition of the hunting of wild hosts of ticks (Vatansever et al., 2007). 46 
Consequently, in recent years the existing laboratory and health care facility infrastructure in 47 
south-eastern Europe and the Balkans, and especially in Turkey, had to adapt to deal with a 48 
large influx of patients and samples potentially infected with a hazard group 4 pathogen.  49 
The purpose of this paper is to review experiences of HCWs and scientists in handling CCHF 50 
patients and CCHFV-positive materials in order to derive safe recommendations for safe 51 
laboratory processing of known or suspected CCHFV-infected samples, and particularly at 52 
which biosafety level CCHFV material and samples from CCHF patients can be handled safely. 53 
First of all we re-aphraise CCHF case fatality rates in endemic countries and in clinical cases. 54 
This is followed by a review of nosocomial infections and the most recent data from the large 55 
epidemic in Turkey, which indicate CCHFV is less easily transmitted from person to person than 56 
thought as exemplified by seroprevelance studies amongst health care workers dealing with 57 
CCHF patients, and is not transmitted in the community. We then turn to laboratory acquired 58 
infections (LAI) while handling diagnostic or research samples and revealing that most 59 
infections were due to breaches of biosafety procedures in place and that a surprising high 60 
number of these infections had a mild or self limiting course. Finally we look at inactivation 61 
procedures for diagnostic samples to then formulate our recommendations for working with 62 
CCHFV. 63 
 64 
Reported mortality rates and seroprevalences 65 
Observed case fatality rates (CFR) in CCHF vary from 2-30%, and are influenced by efficiency of 66 
diagnosis, cohort size sampled, and speed of clinical intervention [1, 2]. Reported CFR include 67 
25% from South Africa [10], 26% from Kosovo [11] and 15% from Iran and Bulgaria  [12,13]. A 68 
structured epidemiological investigation in South Africa revealed that all or most infections in 69 
that country result in clinical disease (Fisher-Hoch et al., 1992). Analysis of ProMED entries on 70 
CCHF from 1998 through 2013 reveals a CFR of 13% among 3,426 cases reported from Turkey, 71 
Russia, Iran, Pakistan, and Afghanistan [2]. In South Russia the CFR has decreased from 12-72 
16% (1953 -1967) through 1.5-2% (2006-2010) to 3.6-5.1% (2011-2013). This is possibly due to 73 
an increased use of diagnostic kits and awareness of CCHF among medical staff [3]. 74 
Following a regional epidemic in Turkey in 2003 and subsequent spread, 9787 cases with a 75 
CFR of 4.6% were recorded by the end of 2015, which represents the highest number of cases 76 
on record [14]. Studies in Turkey revealed a seroprevalence of 10%-15% in outbreak regions, 77 
with 88% of infections appearing to be subclinical [15,16]. The disease is often milder in 78 
children than in adults [17]. Additionally, the circulation of CCHFV in endemic regions of 79 
Turkey is supported by serological studies on domestic and wild animals, with antibody 80 
prevalences reflecting the feeding preferences of the Hyalomma tick species that transmit the 81 
virus. [18-23]. 82 
CCHFV strain AP92 has been suggested to be less virulent than other CCHFV strains [24-26]. It 83 
was initially isolated in 1975 [27], from Rhipicephalus bursa collected from goats in Greece 84 
and AP92-like sequences have only recently been detected in ticks in Greece, Kosovo and 85 
Albania. A CCHFV AP92 like strain was also described in human cases in Turkey but only 86 
causing mild CCHF [24,26]. Recent data indicate a high CCHFV seroprevalence of up to 15% in 87 
some CCHF non-endemic areas of Greece (Kastoria) possibly correlated to CCHFV-AP92 88 
transmission by R. bursa. This seems to be confirmed by recent data from Kosovo and Albania 89 
[11,28,29]. The serological and epidemiological data support the initial assessment that 90 
CCHFV AP92 may be less pathogenic however there are no laboratory data to confirm this. 91 
In contrast, after 13 years the CFR in Turkey remains about 5% despite major efforts to 92 
implement protection and prevention measures as well as public health training programmes 93 
and social mobilisation [14,15,26,30]. 94 
 95 
Nosocomial CCHF infections 96 
Nosocomial infections were recorded during the first reported outbreaks of ‘Crimean 97 
haemorrhagic fever’ in 1944 and 1945, and subsequently in other parts of the former Soviet 98 
Union and neighbouring countries (Hoogstraal, 1979). A more recent detailed literature 99 
review of nosocomial CCHF transmission to HCW listed 44 infections in 494 HCW contacts in 100 
12 countries [4]. Nosocomial infections were reported from South Africa [31-35], Mauretania 101 
[36], Sudan [37], Albania [38,39], Kosovo [40], Bulgaria [41,42], Turkey [43,44], Iran [45-47], 102 
Dubai [48], Pakistan [49,50], India [51], Tajikistan [52], Kazakhstan [53] and Germany [54].  103 
Nosocomial transmission often occurs during early illness before CCHF is recognized in the 104 
source patient, or where diagnostic laboratory capability is not available, and is usually 105 
associated with lack of, or improper use of, personal protective equipment (PPE). Once CCHF 106 
is recognized nosocomial infection tends to occur most commonly where source patients 107 
manifest severe disease, probably because they develop the highest viraemias. Recent studies 108 
confirm that when a threshold of 108 viral genomes per ml of blood is exceeded the disease 109 
progresses to fatal outcome [9,55]. 110 
In general there is a very low CCHFV seropositivity in HCW dealing with CCHF patients in 111 
Turkey [56,57], and data on infections in HCW in Turkey describe, an up to 33% risk of 112 
infection associated with needlestick injuries, and a 9% risk after contact with body fluids [58]. 113 
In Iran serological studies revealed a seroconversion rate of 3.8% in HCW exposed to CCHF 114 
patients. The seroconversion was 9.3% in HCW who had unprotected skin contact with body 115 
fluids and 7.1% in those who suffered percutaneous injuries [59]. A more recent study 116 
covering 9 hospitals which managed 50% of CCHF patients in Turkey from 2002-2014 found 51 117 
HCW exposures by needlestick (62.7%), splashes (23.5%) and unidentified cause (13.7%). Only 118 
25 of these 51 exposures led to laboratory confirmed infections and 4 deaths [60]. 119 
High compliance to and proper use of PPE can indeed minimize the risk of infection as 120 
documented in a study from the Cumhuriyet University Education and Research Hospital in 121 
Turkey, were 1284 confirmed CCHF patients were treated between 2002 and 2012. The total 122 
seropositivity for CCHFV IgG was only 0.53% in HCW in infectious disease wards which showed 123 
a high compliance to PPE of 100%, 88.6%, and 82.9% for gowns, gloves and masks [61]. This is 124 
supported by another survey of 90 HCWs from 3 hospitals in the endemic regions which found 125 
a low seropositivity rate of 1% [62]. 126 
Altogether the clinical consensus is that simple barrier nursing and PPE can provide a good 127 
measure of protection to HCW [4]. This is for example the case in the Ankara Ataturk Training 128 
and Research Hospital, were HCWs use contact protection (hand hygiene, gowns and gloves 129 
when needed). N95 masks and goggles are used only when dealing with patients with severe 130 
haemorrhagic symptoms in need of aerosol and droplet producing procedures such as 131 
aspiration and intubation. This pragmatic approach reduces full protection to the most severe 132 
cases from which nosocomial CCHFV transmission is most probable. Over the years four 133 
doctors and three nurses had contact with infected blood and body fluids of CCHF patients, 134 
through needlestick injury, skin contact, contact to mucosal surfaces, and probable 135 
aerosolization. All index cases were CCHFV PCR positive. The only HCW who developed 136 
seroconversion intubated an unconscious patient who had suffered a seizure. She was 137 
wearing gloves but no respiratory or eye protection.  138 
In another incident one HCW from the Ankara hospital forgot to don goggles when performing 139 
an emergency cardiopulmonary resuscitation (CPR) treatment of a severely ill CCHF patient. 140 
When injecting a drug some blood squirted into her eye, which was immediately washed. 141 
Neither infection nor seroconversion resulted from the incident. Furthermore, no 142 
seroconversion was observed in any of the team performing the CPR without protective N95 143 
masks (Z. Kocak Tufan, Turkey, personal communication). 144 
 145 
Laboratory acquired infections (LAI) while handling patient samples 146 
Modern diagnostic procedures usually compromise extraction of RNA from blood or other 147 
tissues of patients and the performance of an RT-PCR, plus antibody tests on heat-inactivated 148 
serum [57]. Culture of specimens for isolation of virus is performed less frequently. 149 
Eight laboratory infections, one fatal, were recorded in Uganda during early investigations of 150 
‘Congo’ virus in the 1960s. Where known, exposure of patients to infection occurred during 151 
the handling or processing of infected mice (EAVRI Reports cited in [63]).  152 
A laboratory assistant infected himself while preparing plasma from a blood sample of a CCHF 153 
patient by centrifugation in 1986 in a laboratory in Rostov-na-Donu, Russia. The assistant 154 
developed a full-blown CCHF clinical picture including haemorrhages but survived after 155 
prolonged convalescence. A high initial CCHFV LD50 titer on day 1 and seroconversion were 156 
demonstrated [64]. 157 
In South Africa, a clinical pathology laboratory technologist in a hospital in Kimberly was found 158 
to be seropositive for CCHF in 1986, but the presence of IgG antibody could not be 159 
conclusively linked to an earlier benign illness. The technologist routinely wore a laboratory 160 
coat and disposable gloves and performed all manipulations with blood and serum in class II 161 
cabinets. She used automated haematology and clinical pathology machines. A fatal case of 162 
CCHF occurred in 2006 in a technologist in a clinical pathology laboratory in Vereeniging, 163 
South Africa, who putatively only handled blood samples from a deceased CCHF patient in 164 
order to store them in a freezer. He had signed a procedure protocol which instructed him to 165 
wear a laboratory coat and gloves, but nobody observed him storing the samples. The 166 
technologist reportedly had not tested the samples and it was never determined whether he 167 
had worn gloves, or how he was exposed to infection, but virus isolates from the source 168 
patient and the technologist had identical nucleotide sequences. By the end of 2014 a total of 169 
214 cases of CCHF had been confirmed in South Africa since the first case was recognized in 170 
1981. The diagnostic tests involved the handling of 811 acute phase blood samples at BSL-2 or 171 
3 level with PPE (disposable gown, gloves, laboratory spectacles and N95 masks) without 172 
infections or seroconversions being recorded in the diagnostic laboratory, where the 173 
personnel regularly handle such specimens. The equipment used included class II cabinets, 174 
bench centrifuges, PCR thermocyclers, electrophoresis tanks, gel documentation readers, 175 
ELISA plate washers and readers and fluorescence microscopes. Mouse inoculation and tissue 176 
harvesting were performed in class II cabinets and cages were held in a dedicated room with 177 
Hepa-filtered air supply and exhaust. 178 
In contrast, the two laboratory infections reported above, occurred in clinical pathology 179 
laboratories in hospitals where CCHF is infrequently encountered so that an adequate state of 180 
awareness is more difficult to maintain (all information on South Africa; R. Swanepoel, 181 
personal communication).  182 
In Turkey, laboratory services issued instructions on the taking and shipment of samples, and 183 
made the information widely available on a web page (www.thsk.gov.tr). Shipments were 184 
strictly controlled and out of necessity diagnostic assays were performed in BSL-2 laboratories. 185 
Samples had to be handled in class II biosafety cabinets using PPE  (lab coat , gloves, googles 186 
and NP95 mask).  [30]. Although a BSL-3 laboratory was finally opened in Ankara in 2012, it is 187 
not used for CCHFV diagnostics. At the time of drafting the present report there had been 188 
9,787 clinical and laboratory confirmed cases of CCHF since 2003, and an estimated 90.000-189 
100000 samples had been processed under BSL-2 conditions [60]. In some hospitals CCHF 190 
blood samples are handled on the open bench by HCW wearing gloves and N95 masks, but no 191 
goggles. (Z. Kocak Tufan and C. Bulut, Turkey, personal communication). Two case of LAI have 192 
been reported one due to a needlestick while drawing blood and one due to handling a blood 193 
sample without wearing gloves [60]. 194 
 195 
Laboratory acquired infections during research 196 
In an incident in the Rostov-na-Donu laboratory in 1970, one of 4 staff members exposed to 197 
aerosols from a flask containing live virus that disintegrated in a centrifuge fell severely ill and 198 
died. In this instance an underlying chronic hepatocholecystis may have contributed to the 199 
fatal outcome [64]. 200 
In 1973, at the Institute for Epidemiology, Microbiology and Infectious Disease in Alma Ata 201 
(USSR, now Kasakhstan) a scientist preparing CCHFV antigen from suckling mouse brain using 202 
freon extraction, fell severely ill and seroconverted but recovered. It was concluded that 203 
mixing volatile Freon with the brain suspension may have caused formation of aerosols which 204 
were inhaled. As a consequence work with volatile substances such as freon was required to 205 
be performed in chemical cabinets only [65]. 206 
In 1981, a virologist died in Cairo, Egypt after mouth-pipetting a culture of an CCHFV isolate he 207 
had brought from Iraq (A. A. El-Sanousi, Egypt, personal communication).  208 
At the Institute Pasteur de Dakar two accidents were linked to handling suckling mice 209 
inoculated with a diagnostic sample and a tick pool suspension: in 1998 a technician suffered 210 
a needle stick accident, and in 1993 a staff member in breach of regulations handled cages 211 
with infected mice on an open bench without wearing any mask. They both fell ill, but 212 
experienced mild, self limiting disease. Also in 1993, another technician was exposed to 213 
aerosols while preparing sucrose acetone antigen from infected suckling mouse brain since 214 
not all equipment was held in a laminar flow cabinet or in a BSL-3 laboratory. Again the 215 
disease was self-limiting. A BSL-3 laboratory was built in Dakar in 1999. Henceforth, infected 216 
mouse cages were held in a special laboratory and brain material was treated with beta 217 
propiolactone prior to use as antigen in routine ELISA for IgM/G antibody detection and 218 
immune ascitic fluid production in mice. 219 
In 1999 a technician inflicted an abrasion on her hand with a needle during a CCHFV baby 220 
mouse brain passage procedure in the National Center of Infectious and Parasitic Diseases 221 
laboratory in Sofia, in Bulgaria. However, she was vaccinated with the Bulgarian CCHFV 222 
vaccine and presented with benign febrile illness only. In 2010, a Turkish laboratory worker in 223 
a university laboratory inadvertently poured a flask with a 10th passage CCHFV culture down 224 
the front of her labcoat but was not infected nor seroconverted (Aykut Ozkul, Turkey, 225 
personal communication).  226 
 227 
Inactivation 228 
Several publications have shown that chaotropic guanidine-isothiocyanate in commercial 229 
nucleic acid extraction buffers efficiently inactivates most enveloped viral agents including 230 
pox-, alpha-, bunya-, flavi- and filoviruses [66-68]. 231 
Non-treated acute phase serum samples of CCHF patients stored at +40C remain real time-PCR 232 
positive for up to 30 days but the infectivity of these samples was not verified (A Kubar, 233 
Turkey, personal communication). For serological analysis diagnostic laboratories in Turkey 234 
and South East Europe use thermal inactivation of serum at 56°C for 30 min or even 45 min 235 
although it was concluded in one study that 60°C for 60 min is more effective for CCHFV [69].  236 
In experiments recently performed in the South African laboratory to clearly analyse the 237 
conditions needed to inactivate CCHFV, CCHFV (strain SPU4/81) culture fluid with a titre of 1 x 238 
107.6 TCID50/ml was incubated at 56°C and 60°C for 15, 30, 45 and 60 minutes and then 239 
inoculated into Vero E6 cell cultures. In all instances virus growth was not detected. To show 240 
that the results were not due to the detection limit of the TCID assay at 1 x 101.5 TCID50 /ml, 241 
the inactivated suspensions were also inoculated intracerebraly into suckling mice (NIH strain) 242 
and all mice survived, even those inoculated with virus inactivated at 56°C for only 15 minutes 243 
(Figure 1). The experiments confirm that heat inactivation at 56°C/30 min used as a standard 244 
in Turkish (national guideline) and many other laboratories in south-eastern Europe is 245 
adequate for destruction of infectivity, and explains why LAI have not been reported from 246 
these diagnostic laboratories. 247 
 248 
Biosafety regulations 249 
The UN Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of 250 
Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin weapons and on their Destruction (BTWC) as 251 
promulgated in 1972 imposed requirements on member states (party to the convention) for 252 
acquiring, holding, stockpiling, working with or disposing of certain pathogens (the list 253 
includes CCHFV) at specified biosafety levels, but BTWC lacked an organization or mechanisms 254 
to monitor and enforce compliance. Consequently, UN Security Council Resolution 1540 was 255 
passed in 2004 to enforce domestic compliance on states parties as well as non-state actors 256 
through a 1540 committee. Purely diagnostic procedures and laboratories are exempted. It 257 
should be noted that documents such as the Laboratory Safety Manual [WHO, 2004], the 258 
Biosafety in Microbiological and Biomedical Laboratories manual [56], and the European CEN 259 
Workshop Agreement 15793 [CWA 15793, 2011] only make recommendations on biosafety, 260 
and do not impose legal requirements. Each country must promulgate its own biosafety 261 
legislation and regulations, and many have not yet done so. Consequently, there is wide 262 
divergence in the biosafety levels prescribed for handling CCHFV as some countries attempt to 263 
reconcile disease endemicity with laboratory capacity. 264 
In a recent survey of laboratories in 28 countries that are members of the European Network 265 
for Diagnostics of Imported Viral Diseases (ENIVD), it was found that 7 countries sent 266 
diagnostic samples for CCHF to reference centres elsewhere, 5 tested samples in BSL-2 267 
laboratories, 10 in BSL-3 laboratories and 6 in BSL-4 laboratories. Of 11 laboratories 268 
performing virus isolation and propagation, 6 did so in BSL-4 facilities and 5 in lower-grade 269 
facilities [70]. Enquiries made for purposes of the present review revealed that in Slovenia, 270 
Turkey and Senegal CCHFV diagnostic samples were handled at BSL-2 for years before a BSL-3 271 
laboratory was finally available for research. In many other countries including Turkey, Kosovo, 272 
Albania, Bulgaria diagnostics are still performed at BSL-2. Even in the US diagnostic samples 273 
are not handled in BSL-4 but in BSL-2 laboratories until the presence of CCHFV has been 274 
confirmed. In most non endemic countries diagnostic investigations however are conducted in 275 
BSL-4 facilities. All countries tend to use higher grade facilities for research (Table 1). 276 
 277 
Discussion 278 
In non-endemic countries that coincidentally tend to be better resourced and can afford 279 
sophisticated laboratories, CCHFV is classed and handled as a hazard group 4 agent (Table 1). 280 
Agents in this group cause severe disease, are a serious hazard to staff, are likely to spread to 281 
the community and there is no effective prophylaxis or treatment. In contrast, most endemic 282 
countries have perforce had to perform diagnostic tests under BSL-2 or 3 conditions, using 283 
appropriate PPE and laboratory practices. In particular, Turkey and several of the Balkan 284 
countries have processed large numbers of specimens without experiencing any LAI over 285 
many years. Although virological and seroepidemiological studies indicate that strains of virus 286 
circulating in the region may have reduced virulence, this alone does not account for the lack 287 
of observed LAI since monitoring for seroconversion confirms that transmission to HCW is rare. 288 
The present survey was performed to collect information on LAI in hospitals, and diagnostic 289 
and research laboratories. Only a few were identified. Such infections as have been reported 290 
in BSL-2 diagnostic laboratories almost invariably result from breaches of biosafety practise. 291 
Handling samples without gloves or mouth pipetting used in the initial isolations of CCHFV in 292 
the 1950s are no longer acceptable. Lessons have been learned from exposure to droplets in 293 
research settings, and in particular centrifuge buckets should be fitted with biosafety seals 294 
(clip on lids), and hazardous procedures should be performed in biosafety cabinets [71]. 295 
Outside of cabinets, culture flasks should be carried in sealed boxes, lids should be used on 296 
ELISA and culture plates during incubation, and film seals used for reading of plates. Sera 297 
should be heat-inactivated at 56°C/30 min before performing antibody tests.  298 
Safety can be increased by wearing PPE commonly used in BSL-3 laboratories (face shield 299 
instead of goggles), without necessarily having to rely on positive pressure respirators. 300 
Accidental spillage of infected material unfortunately remains a possibility, but need not 301 
necessarily have a serious outcome as exemplified by the spill onto a Turkish laboratory 302 
worker. Animal inoculation procedures should preferably be avoided in diagnostic 303 
laboratories that do not have BSL-3 or -4 facilities. For BSL-3 laboratories measures as 304 
implemented in Dakar are advisable. 305 
There is however an ongoing debate on aerosol transmission of CCHFV in clinical settings 306 
There are only few reports describing the infection of close relatives of CCHFV patients, and 307 
these lack conclusive evidence of aerosol transmission [72,73]. On the contrary none of a 308 
cohort of 132 relatives staying with or visiting 88 CCHF patients of whom two patients died at 309 
the Cumhuriyet University Hospital in Turkey, developed any symptoms nor seroconverted 310 
despite the fact that many did not comply with protective measures [74]. The study indicates 311 
that CCHF is not easily spread between humans and into the community. 312 
Although multiple-case incidents of nosocomial infection have been reported (Mauretania, 313 
Sudan, Pakistan [4]) there is no evidence for aerosol transmission in CCHF, and spread of 314 
infection was generally postulated to result from direct contact with body fluids or droplets of 315 
severely ill patients, percutaneous injuries and non compliance with basic infection control 316 
precautions. 317 
A recent review of possible aerosol (1-5µm) or droplet (5-10µm) transmission through 318 
coughing and vomiting in Ebola virus disease, concludes that there are no epidemiological 319 
data to support a large role for this mode of transmission, and that respiratory transmission 320 
(aerosol generation in the lung, exhalation and transmission by inhalation) does not occur [75], 321 
and the same appears to apply to what is currently known about CCHF transmission. In 322 
contrast aerosol transmission is well documented for smallpox virus and was conclusively 323 
shown by retrospective smoke experiments after isolated patients caused nosocomial 324 
transmission in Meschede in Germany [76]. 325 
However if actively generated, aerosols are indeed very likely to increase transmission, as 326 
recently described in a clinical setting due to the use of a compression inhaler to apply 327 
mucolytics and broncholytics to a CCHF patient while only surgical masks were used by HCW 328 
[77]. In a most recent report 2 HCW suffered an infection probably while using bag-valve-329 
mask ventilation, or performing bronchoscopies on an infected patient [54]. The obvious 330 
conclusion is to use fitted N95 masks if inhalation devices are used or aerosols might be 331 
actively generated in any other way. On the other hand, care has to be taken when using this 332 
type of masks, as unpublished data from Public Health England (Nigel Silman, UK, personal 333 
communication) show that the filter of N95 masks should not be used for more than 2 hours 334 
as humidity trapped in the mask will bridge the filter, thus negating its efficiency.  335 
In conclusion, diagnostic tests have been performed safely at BSL-2 level for many years in 336 
CCHF endemic countries that could not otherwise cope with demand. We therefore 337 
recommend that regulating authorities should revise biosafety requirements for CCHF 338 
diagnostic procedures to allow the required tests to be performed under enhanced BSL-2 339 
conditions with appropriate biosafety laboratory equipment and PPE used according to 340 
standardized protocols in the affected countries (see box 1). In this respect we’d like to point 341 
out that class I cabinets which draw air away from the operator are preferable to class II 342 
cabinets which provide a sterile working area through creating a laminar flow. Organizations 343 
such as the Centres for Disease Control and Prevention, USA, the National Institutes for Health, 344 
USA, the World Health Organization, and the European Committee for Standardization, should 345 
revise international recommendations accordingly. Technical advances arising from the 346 
successful deployment of mobile BSL-3 laboratories in the West African outbreak of Ebola 347 
disease [78-81] should be exploited to derive cost-effective improvements to diagnostic 348 
laboratories in the CCHF endemic countries. In particular, the use of flexible-walled or hard 349 
plastic glove boxes for extraction of nucleic acids and inactivation of sera would greatly 350 
improve laboratory safety. The evidence on LAI and LAI outcome, transmissibility and CFRs 351 
should merit to discuss the possibility of relaxing biosafety standards for research on CCHFV, 352 
and the graded application of isolation precautions in the treatment of patients according to 353 
clinical status should be codified. 354 
 355 
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Table1. CCHFV hzard groups and biosafety levels 368 
 369 
 370 
Country Endemic Hazard 
group 
Biosafety level of  
CCHFV diagnostics 
Biosafety level 
of CCHFV 
research 
South-Africa + 2 BSL-2 1980-2004 
BSL-3 since 2004 
BSL 4 
 
Slovenia  
 
- 4 BSL-2 1995-2004 
BSL-3 since 2004 
BSL 3 since 
2004 
Albania 
 
+ 2 BSL-2 BSL-3  
Kosovo 
 
+ 2 BSL-2 BSL-2 
Greece + 4 BSL-2 1975-1987 BSL 3 glovebox 
introduced in 
1987 
Bulgaria 
 
+ 3 BSL-2 BSL-3  
Serbia 
 
+ ? BSL-2 ---- 
Turkey  
 
+ 2 BSL-2  BSL-3 since 
2012 
Kazakhstan 
 
+ 4 BSL-3 BSL-4 
Georgia + 
 
4 BSL-3 BSL-4  
Iran 
 
+ 3 BSL-2 glovebox  
Senegal + 3 BSL-2 glovebox 1990-1999 
BSL-3 2000-2015  
 
BSL 3  
Germany 
 
- 4 BSL-4  BSL 4 
Sweden - 
 
4 BSL 4 BSL 4 
United Kingdom 
 
- 4 BSL 4 BSL 4 
France - 4 
 
BSL 4 BSL 4 
United States 
 
- 4 BSL-3  
 
BSL 4 
 371 
 372 
 373 
 374 
 375 
Box 1 376 
 377 
 378 
  379 
Recommendations for working with CCHFV 
 
Primary containment 
BSL-2 laboratory 
Class I / Class II biosafety cabinet* 
 
PPE 
Labcoat 
Gloves 
Goggles / Face-shield 
N95 mask 
 
Additional Procedures 
Thermal inactivation of samples at 56°C/30min 
Guanidin-thiocyonate based nucleic acid extraction 
Seal ELISA plates with transparent film bevor removing from biosafety cabinet 
Use centrifugation buckets with clipp on lids, open buckets in biosafety cabinet 
only. 
 
 
*. It is recommended to switch to class I cabinets if possible. 
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Figure legend 628 
 629 
Figure 1. Percent survival of suckling mice i.c. injected with CCHFV-FBS mix (1 x 107.3 TCID50 /ml ). 630 
Dark grey dots: Untreated CCHFV-FBS mix (positive control, n=9 mice). Grey squares CCHFV-FBS 631 
mix treated at RT/15min (n=4), Grey triangles: CCHFV-FBS mix treated at RT/60min (n=9). White 632 
circles: CCHFV-FBS mix treated at 56°C for 15/30/45/60 minutes (n= 8/8/8/5), White triangles: 633 
CCHFV-FBS mix treated at 60°C for 15/30/45/60 minutes (n= 10/8/10/10). Please note that due to 634 
overlay only on line with white circles and one line with white triangles can be seen on the graph. 635 
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